Monthly Archives: June 2017

Named Plaintiffs Can’t Voluntarily Dismiss Individual Claims in Order to Appeal Class Certification Denial

View David Wright's Complete Bio at robinsonbradshaw.comEarlier this year, we hazarded a guess that the Supreme Court was split 4-4 regarding a Ninth Circuit decision holding that a named plaintiff could achieve appellate review of a decision denying class certification by voluntarily dismissing his individual claims. It turns out, based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker [], that the internal debate was not so much over whether the Ninth Circuit erred in allowing the appeal, but whether that error had both statutory and constitutional implications. The Supreme Court had accepted certiorari to review “[w]hether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice.” With Justice Gorsuch on the sidelines, the Court unanimously held that the named plaintiffs’ gamesmanship did not allow appellate review, but the justices differed in their reasons for that outcome.

Five members of the Court, led by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that such an appeal was inconsistent with F.R. App. P. 23(f). The majority reasoned that “[r]espondents’ voluntary-dismissal tactic . . . invites protracted litigation and piecemeal appeals,” and would – essentially – turn Rule 23(f)’s “discretionary regime” into a license for plaintiffs to force an interlocutory appeal of a ruling denying class certification. This, the Court noted, would upset “Rule 23(f)’s careful calibration” and “Congress[’] final decision rule would end up a pretty puny one.”

In our previous post, we sounded an alarm about the “one way street” that was a feature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, noting that “This option—if allowed by the Supreme Court—works only for plaintiffs in class action cases, not defendants. If defendants suffer an adverse class certification ruling, and the appellate court does not exercise its discretion to accept the interlocutory appeal, defendants must litigate the case to judgment before obtaining review of the class determination.” Justice Ginsburg agreed with us on this point, observing in her opinion for the majority that “[t]he one-sidedness of respondents’ voluntary-dismissal device ‘reinforce[s] our conclusion [of no jurisdiction],” and that “the ‘class issue’ may be just as important to defendants.”

Although the majority founded its decision on 28 U.S.C. Section 1291, thereby avoiding the Article III issue, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito and the Chief Justice, wrote a concurring opinion that took the constitutional issue head on. The concurrence argued that there was no Article III “case or controversy” following the named plaintiffs’ dismissal of their claims. Justice Thomas noted that “it has long been the rule that a party may not appeal from the voluntary dismissal of a claim,” and that the parties were “no longer adverse to each other on any claims” after that dismissal. A favorable ruling on class certification could not, the concurring opinion explained, “revive [the named plaintiffs’] individual claims.”

With deference to the Ninth Circuit jurists who proceeded to adjudicate the appeal in Baker, this was not a particularly hard case. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the so-called “death-knell” doctrine, which had permitted plaintiffs to appeal as of right a district court order denying a motion for class certification. Given that decision, and the fact that Rule 23(f) appellate jurisdiction is discretionary, not mandatory, it is difficult to see how a voluntary dismissal gambit could ultimately succeed. Unfortunately now for Xbox gamers, they will have to litigate their ‘disc gouging’ claims one by one . . . .

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Recent Filings – May Digest

View Amanda Pickens’ Complete Bio at robinsonbradshaw.comNot every class action court filing in North and South Carolina becomes a full-length post on our blog. Here is a recap of May’s filings:

Kasprzyk, et al. v. Hilton Grand Vacations Company, LLC, et al., No. 4:17-cv-01393 (D.S.C. May 26, 2017) (purported collective and class action brought under FLSA alleging defendants deducted wages, straight time and overtime pay from commissions earned.)

Berg, et al. v. Span-America Medical Systems, Inc., et al., No. 6:17-cv-01399 (D.S.C. May 26, 2017) (putative class action alleging defendants, who entered into an agreement and plan of merger in early May 2017, filed a solicitation statement that contained false and misleading information and omitted material information thereby violating federal securities laws.)

Giles, et al. v. BNC Bancorp, et al., No. 1:17-cv-00482 (M.D.N.C. May 25, 2017) (putative class action on behalf of shareholders of defendant BNC Bancorp, a publicly traded bank holding company, and its officers and directors, asserting securities violations for failing to disclose material information through incomplete and misleading proxy statements in advance of a proposed merger with Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc.)

Pill, et al. v. Span-America Medical Systems, Inc., No. 6:17-cv-01375 (D.S.C. May 25, 2017) (putative class action alleging defendants Span-America Medical Systems and Savaris (SC), Inc., who manufacture various products for the medical market, entered into a flawed sales process in early May 2017 which favored Salvaria at the expense of Span’s shareholders, thereby alleging violation of federal and state securities laws.)

Porter, et al. v. Span-America Medical Systems, Inc., No. 6:17-cv-01357 (D.S.C. May 25, 2017) (putative class action alleging defendants entered into an agreement/plan of merger in early May 2017 which is materially deficient regarding financial projections and potential conflicts of interest regarding various managers and directors in violation of federal and state securities laws.)

Gagliastre, et al. v. Capt. George’s Seafood Restaurants, LP, et al., No. 4:17-cv-01308 (D.S.C. May 19, 2017) (putative class action and collective action alleging defendants, who own seafood buffet restaurants, misappropriated tips, required servers to work off the clock and otherwise failed to pay overtime compensation to employees under FLSA and state wage and hour laws.)

Salvo, et al. v. NightCap Inc. Food & Spirits, et al., No. 2:17-cv-01266 (D.S.C. May 17, 2017) (putative class action and collective action brought by servers, bartenders and other “tipped workers” alleging defendants failed to pay compensation due under FLSA and state wage and hour laws seeking to recover minimum wages, unlawful deductions and other wages due to employees.)

Christian, et al. v. TOWERCOMM, LLC, No. 5:17-cv-00223 (E.D.N.C. May 9, 2017) (putative class action and collective action brought by employees of defendant who were tower technicians performing maintenance, repair and installation and allege they were not paid overtime compensation that was due under FLSA and state wage and hour laws.)

Walton v. Maury Cobb & Associates, LLC, et al., No. 5:17-cv-00209 (E.D.N.C. May 2, 2017) (putative class action brought under federal consumer protection laws on behalf of consumers residing in North Carolina alleging defendants sent collection letters with original creditor information which was false and/or misleading.)

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Is an Institutional Investor Subject to the PSLRA’s “Professional Plaintiff” Bar?

View David Wright's Complete Bio at robinsonbradshaw.comThe Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) establishes special rules in securities class actions. One such rule, found in 15 U.S.C. Sect. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) and known as the “Five-in-Three Provision,” prevents a “person” from serving as a lead plaintiff in “more than 5 securities class actions” during any three-year period. Does that rule, though, apply to institutional investors? The plain words of the statute certainly suggest so—it is difficult to argue that an institutional investor is not a “person,” and had Congress wanted to exclude institutional investors from this prohibition, it could easily have done so. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, an active lead plaintiff, lost this issue in the Eastern District of Virginia last fall, when Judge Ellis found that the statutory language was clear. See Knurr v. Orbitral ATK, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-1031, 2016 WL 661157 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2016) (noting that “it is doubtful that Congress would have hidden a major exemption in a single word,” echoing Justice Scalia’s phrase that “Congress . . . does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes”).

But, as Judge Ellis also acknowledged, “one purpose of the [PSLRA] is to encourage institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff.” And the House Conference Report pertaining to the PSLRA states that “institutional investors seeking to serve as lead plaintiff may need to exceed [the limit of lead plaintiffs] and do not represent the type of professional plaintiff this legislation seeks to restrict.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 35 (1995). So how to square this tension?

Recently, in Ollila v. Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-109 (W.D.N.C. May 25, 2017), Judge Cogburn acknowledged these competing lines of authority but ultimately side-stepped the issue. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, which had lost its argument to serve as lead plaintiff in Knurr, had better success with Judge Cogburn. Judge Cogburn found Knurr “persuasive,” but found “similarly persuasive” “the number of other district court cases that have held that institutional investors are not subject to the ‘five-in-three’ limitation.” Indeed, Judge Cogburn cited case law emphasizing that “the ‘majority’ view is that institutional investors are not subject to the professional plaintiff ‘three-in-five’ bar.”

Ultimately, Judge Cogburn took refuge in a section of the PSLRA that permits the court to override the “professional plaintiff limitation.” See 15 U.S.C. Sect. 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi). The putative financial losses of ATRS, which exceeded $5 million in the case, “dwarf[ed] those alleged by the competing institutional plaintiff,” leading the court to exercise its discretion to appoint ATRS as lead plaintiff even in the face of its activism in shareholder class actions across the country.

It remains to be seen whether the textual argument of Judge Ellis will ultimately hold sway in the Fourth Circuit.

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